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Abstract—We introduce the notion of an intelligent software decoy, and provide both an architecture and event-based lan !guage for automatic
implementation of them.  Our decoys detect and respond to patterns of suspicious behavior, and main !tain ! a repository of rules for behavior
patterns and de!coying actions.  As an example, we construct a model of system behavior from an initial list of event types and their at!tributes in
the interaction between com!puter worms and an operating sys !tem.  The model represents patterns of suspicious or malicious events that the
software decoy should detect, and specific ac!tions to be taken in response.  Our approach explicitly treats both standard and nonstandard
invocations of components, with the latter representing an attempt to circumvent the public interface of the component.a
 
Index terms—Behavior modeling, computer security, computer worm, event trace, software decoy, intrusion detection, intrusion tolerance
 
This paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance, West Point, NY, June 2002.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software components with poorly designed interfaces are susceptible to misuse or modification by rogue programs.  Consider, for
example, the result of unleashing the Morris Internet worm (vid. Spafford [1]):  Some integral compo!nents of the UNIX operating system
per!mitted the worm to propagate itself over the Internet. What were some of shortcomings of some versions of Unix in 1988?  One was
that some components permitted incor!rect argu!ment types to be executed, such as the sendmail program ac!cepting commands instead of
user addresses.  Another weakness was that some components al!lowed for errone!ous argument values to be passed to functions, such as a
string of 536 bytes passed to the input buffer of the fingerd program:  That string exceeds the size of the buffer, but fingerd and the func!-
tions it calls in the C lan !guage I/O library do not check, re!sulting in a buffer overflow.
Software patches were made to sendmail and fingerd in response to the Morris worm.  The patches consisted of exception-handling
routines for catching errors in input arguments to these programs.  The effectiveness of the patches was low at first because of delays
between the release and installation.
 
History continues to repeat itself.  Distributed systems are plagued by worms descended from the Morris worm, such as the well-
publicized “Code Red” worm [2] that exploits weaknesses in the public interfaces of components of the Microsoft Windows NT
operating system that manipulate the registry.[1]  The “patch-and-pray” approach to dealing with such weaknesses in interfaces has not
been effective.  Shortly af!ter the in!troduction of the original, a variant of the Code Red worm appeared which took ad !vantage of other
weaknesses in the interfaces of those same compo!nents of the operating system [3].
 
In this paper we explore a new way of thinking about the challenges associated with protecting components within distributed systems
from the effects of attacks.  In par!ticular, we de!velop the mechanisms needed to realize a modified version of what Michael and Riehle
call an in!telli!gent software decoy [4].  Intelligent software decoys adapt in order to tolerate both intrusions into systems by unauthorized
users and misuse of components, rather than either indi!cating to the intruder or offending process that a violation of security policy has
been detected or termi!nating the interaction with the process.  Each software component has a con!tract con !sisting of a class invariant and
one or more preconditions and post!conditions; com!munication with a component is only permitted via its contract interface.  Class
invari!ants govern the nature and extent of any change to objects within a component by a nonstandard invocation (i.e., circumvention) of
the com!ponent’s public interface.
 
When a calling process passes arguments, via remote pro!cedure call or remote method invocation, that violate the contract of a
component, the component transitions from its nominal operating mode to a deception mode, in which it attempts to both deceive the
calling process into con !cluding that its violation of the contract has been success !ful and assess the nature of the violation.  For ex !ample,
suppose a precondition in a contract asserts that input strings shall not exceed 512 bytes.  If the component re!ceives a string that violates
this condition, then the component tries to continue to engage the calling process that such strings are acceptable while both protecting
the component from the effects of the invocations and as !sessing the nature of the violation.
 
Here we describe an architec!ture and event-based lan!guage for automatic implementation of software decoys.
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II. APPROACH
We start with the introduction of a precise behavior model for the system under consideration. This model is speci!fied in terms of events
and two binary relations over those events:  precedence and inclusion.
 
We provide a formalism to specify rules for runtime in!trusion detection and corresponding countermeasures based on behavior patterns
over event traces and a catalog of decoy actions, such as blocking or substituting certain system commands.  This implies an
implementation based on automatic instrumentation for event detection derived from the behavior model. Intrusion detection rules are
textually separated from the source code of the system, which allows for accumulating and formalizing knowl!edge of typical intrusion
patterns and decoy strategies.
A. Event Traces
An event is an abstraction of any detectable action performed at runtime. An event has a beginning, end, du!ration, and some other
attributes, such as program states at the beginning and end of the event, source code associ!ated with the event, and so on.  Two binary
relations are defined for events.  One event may precede another event.  For example, one statement execution may precede an !other.  In
addition, one event may be included in another.  For instance, a statement-execution event may appear in!side a procedure-call or method-
invocation event.  Each of these binary rela!tions defines a partial ordering of events. System execution may be represented as a set of
events with the two basic relations between them—an event trace.  An event gram !mar [5] is a set of axioms that determines possible
configu!rations of events of different types within the event trace.  We use the notion of com!putations over event traces to specify
behavior patterns and decoy ac!tions.  This mechanism is a basis for auto!matic instrumentation of the source code.
B. Specification of Events
The behavioral model consists of the definition of event types and the attributes of the events.  Our event grammar is used to describe the
struc!ture of events.  The behavioral model consists of two parts: (i) a specification of axioms that define constraints on the behavior of
components; this specifica!tion is given in terms of inclusion and prece!dence relations, and (ii) a description of patterns of be!havior
expressed in terms of event patterns.
 
The event grammar is not intended for actual parsing of an event trace. Each event defined in the behavior model should be detectable by
some independent means, for ex!ample, by proper instrumentation of the source code. There always is a main event execute-
program, which encompasses all other events. Event type and event attribute declarations, and event grammar rules (i.e., axi!oms)
constitute the behavior model, or “lightweight” se!mantics specification for the system under considera!tion.  The following is an example
of an event-grammar rule that specifies that an event of type execute-assignment always contain (i.e., the inclusion rela!tion) two






Intrusion detection and other monitoring activities are defined in terms of this behavior model.  This model opens the way for automatic
source program instrumenta!tion, and provides formalism for describing different kinds of behavior patterns, for example, typical
intrusion patterns.
C. Computations over Event Traces
Event pattern A matches successfully any event of the type A. The event pattern can contain additional context conditions, which
typically involve event attributes, for instance, X: perform-destination & source-code(X) = 'V'. This event pattern
matches an event of type perform-destination, such that source-code attrib!ute of this event is 'V'.  Notice the use of auxiliary vari!able X to
denote the event under consideration.
 
Event patterns are used in aggregate operations to select sequences of events from other event sets. For example, [X:utility-
call & name(X) = 'sendmail' FROM execute-program] yields a sequence of events matching the pattern  X:
utility-call & name(X) = 'sendmail' selected from the whole event trace. An aggregate operation may produce a result
different from just a sequence of events.  For instance, SUM/[X:utility-call & name(X) = 'sendmail' FROM
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execute-program APPLY duration(X)] yields a total duration of events se!lected.
 
Event patterns can be combined in order to specify path expressions:  patterns of event sequences. For instance, the following path
expression specifies a sequence of events starting with event of type A followed by zero or more events of types B or C:  A (B | C)*
 
A probe is a Boolean expression involving event attrib!utes and standard arithmetic and logic operations. It might also contain calls of
subroutines written in some general programming language. Probes may be included in path expressions interlaced with event patterns.
A probe is evaluated immediately after the preceding event pattern has been matched successfully. A probe is successful if it evaluates to




   (value(V at begin X) =
    value (V at end X))
 
These operations provide a basis for computational tasks such as filtering events to create views of the event trace subspace, evaluating
the truth of assertions, and comput!ing specific values (e.g., counting the number of events in a sequence or the maximum elapsed time
for an event pattern).  An important feature of this formalism is that computations over event traces are separated from the source code
itself, and the instrumentation of the source code can be automated, based on the behavior model (i.e., event grammar) and the text of the
trace com!putation.
D. Code Instrumentation
Code instrumentation is needed to recognize patterns of events and to perform computations over the event trace. Our approach is to
selectively specify and automatically instru!ment, on a component-by-component basis, only those event types and event attributes that
are of interest.  For exam!ple, one would likely specify events corre!sponding to popping (i.e., deleting an item from) the stack, reading,
writing, or handling threads (e.g., create, reschedule, de!lete) as events of interest in the context of the behavior of components
comprising an operating sys !tem; only the source code corresponding to these and other events of interest would be instrumented.  For
other components within the operating system, there may not be any events of interest and therefore the source code of those components
would not be instru !mented.
An automated tool for generating the instrumentation would accept as input the program’s source code and the text of trace computation. 
We define the event pattern language and aggregate operations in such a way that event detection, event pattern matching, and other
com!putations over event traces can be performed at runtime. As reported by Sekar and Uppuluri [6], similar instrumen !tation may result
in approximately four percent runtime overhead.  This effect of event-trace computations is im!portant for high-performance systems,
especially for components that are called frequently, such as those com!prising either the scheduler or memory manager of an operating
system. 
 
As an example of how instrumentation would be selec!tively applied, consider a component that implements the Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP); TCP is a fre!quently called component and known to be susceptible to certain types of attacks, such as that of the
“Cheese” worm [7] that attempts to execute commands on a specific TCP port of a system and then mas !querade as the httpd program on
that system.  The change to the httpd program via a Trojan horse is an example of an attack for which a class invariant could be used to
guard against unauthor !ized changes to the behavior of this component.  One of the events of interest would be the invocation of shell
commands on a TCP port.  Due to the fact that there is a sequence of calls resulting from the shell commands, the events at other
components may need to be instrumented; this is the case for the Cheese worm.  Some of the events of interest would be changing
process names, overwriting system files (e.g., /etc/inetd.conf), and repeated attempts to restart a system command (e.g., inetd).  The
compiler used for generating instrumentation would only do so for these types of events.  Specific examples of how to spec!ify events,
their attributes, and actions (i.e., responses to events) are given in the remainder of the paper for the Morris worm.
III. DOMAIN MODELS OF SYSTEM BEHAVIOR
Domain models of system behavior serve as the foun!da!tion from which to specify both patterns of suspicious behavior (i.e., slices of
event histories) and the corre!sponding responses (i.e., actions) of software decoys. A domain model consists of a list of generic event
types, along with their attributes, both of which are associated with a particular class of behavior and detectable.  In this section, we
report our work to date to develop a domain model of detectable events that can be triggered within an operating system by computer
worms:  that is, rogue pro!grams that propagate themselves across computer networks.  In other words, we treat the interaction be!tween a
worm and a particular type of software component as a unique do!main for modeling purposes.  Our motivation here is to both describe
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an event-trace language for implementing software decoys and give spe!cific examples of how one would instrument code for runtime
checking.  Our exam!ples are based on the be!haviors of components of the Unix operating system with the Morris Internet worm.  More
recent worms, such as “Code Red” and “Cheese,” are variants of the Morris worm in at least two ways:  (i) they are composed from the
same set of generic event types, or “building blocks,” and (ii) share the same basic structure, in some cases ini!tiating similar patterns of
events.
A. Interaction between the Worm and Operating System
Although it is still debated as to whether the intent of the author of the worm was to just experiment out of aca!demic interest and the
worm “got loose” due to an egre!gious use of contracts at the interfaces of the compo!nents it called, the interac!tion of the worm with
software com!ponents resulted in a temporary denial of service across much of the Internet.
 
The Morris worm interacts with the components of the operating system by repeatedly accessing a data structure (e.g., the system
password and network configuration files), calling a program to obtain state information (e.g., netstat), or repeatedly invoking a program
and permuting the arguments before each invocation (e.g., rsh).  The worm also invokes sequences of functions and proce!dures, such as
issuing the DEBUG command to the send!mail program followed by a sequence of commands (i.e., the vector portion of the worm
program) to be acted on by procedures available in that operating mode.
In addition to accessing components, the Morris worm attempts to write to files (e.g., set a flag) and execute copies of itself in the form
of Trojan horses.  It also at!tempts to propagate itself while simultaneously eluding detection or spoofing by forking itself after a pre-
speci!fied number of tries at infecting other computers or elapse of time, and then deleting both the parent process and all of the
temporary files created by the parent process.
B. Formal Description of the Domain Model
Here we provide a first approximation of the description of the model.  We begin by specifying five event types and their attributes:
 
fingerd_call
          Attributes:            caller_id
                                          begin_time
param_pass
          Attributes:            length
read
utility_call
          Attributes:            begin_time
                caller_id
                caller_process_type
sendmail_call
                Attributes:            in_debug_mode
 
Next we introduce an axiom that specifies the event fingerd_call contains another event, param_pass:
 
Axiom:  fingerd_call:: ( param_pass)
 
Based on the foregoing specification of events and axi!oms, we can start to build a behavioral specification for the Morris worm as
follows:
 
fingerd_call:: ( x: param_pass )




This behavior pattern, described in terms of a violation of the contract for fingerd calls, states that first an event of the type
fingerd_call is detected, such that the value of at!tribute length of the included event param_pass ex !ceeds a given constant
max_buffer_size; in this case, x is a tentative name associated with the event param_pass.  Next, one or more events of the type
read should appear, and finally a probe (i.e., an evalua!tion of a Boolean expression) specifying buffer overflow should evaluate to the
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value True.  Successful detection of those events and conditions in the specified order indi!cates that the system might be under attack by
the Morris worm or some other worm.  Now let us specify yet an!other behavior pattern:
 
x: sendmail_call::
( [ utility_call + ] 




& in_debug_mode(x) = True
 
Here sendmail_call is specified with the attribute in_debug_mode equal to the value True.  This event contains a sequence of
utility_call events with the same caller_id and caller_process_type at!tribute values, such that the time between those
utility_call events does not exceed time_interval.
C. Summary
In summary, our event-trace language integrates the lan!guage constructs that are necessary for specifying event patterns, probes, and
actions.  An event pattern is a par!ticular interval-based signature constructed from a struc!tural model of events of interest (e.g., system
calls to write to a file).  The probe is a Boolean expression; for instance, a probe can be used to compare the values of two attributes over
the same interval of time, or the value of the same attribute at different points in time.  An action is a message that is generated based on
the recognition that a particular pattern of behavior has been observed:  The pattern of behavior can be composed from one or more slices
of the same or different event traces.  The messages are used to trigger rules that embody the tar!get component’s decoy-mode response to
its interaction with the calling process whose interaction with the component may be malicious or benign.).
IV. DECOY STRATEGY
Decoy methods can show a wide spectrum of complexity.  A key dimension is information in the mathematical sense they provide to the
attacker [8]. A decoy that provides the same canned response to a user command in all circum!stances transmits zero bits of information. 
A decoy that simulates an arbitrary protected file by generating a fake file with random choices transmits information equal to the loga!-
rithm of the number of possible fake files it can create for a given request.  A decoy that simulates a de!nial-of-ser !vice attack, providing
additional operating-system delays monotonically increasing with the number of requests in a recent time interval, transmits information
equal to the logarithm of the number of distinguishable time intervals it can provide.  A decoy that simulates at!tempts to change a
module of the operating system trans !mits information equal to the logarithm of the size of that module (or perhaps the part of it relevant
to a par!ticular attacker activity). It might seem that the ultimate decoy would simulate all aspects of a computer and its software as
proposed by Thimbley et al. [9], requiring information equal to the logarithm of the size of the com!plete descrip !tion of the com!puter and
programming environment, and thus be equivalent to a universal Turing machine.  How !ever, we claim a truly ultimate decoy would be
“intelligent” and need to do more:  It would need to ana!lyze properties of arbitrary code of viruses and Trojan horses to predict their
conceptual consequences.  But such ultimate decoying appears impossible in light of the unde!cidability of nontrivial properties of
recursive functions (vid. Rice’s Theorem [10]).
 
Applying these ideas to the Morris worm, the propagation of the worm could be decoyed by having the operating system count the
number of recent buffer-overflowing fingerd calls (requiring a single integer of memory) and provide additional process-suspension time
in all operat!ing-sys !tem activities; this could most easily be done by just inserting delays into a frequently used utility like file reading,
delays that would only occur for the process threads created by the perceived attacker and would be monotonic with the number of
ongoing threads they have created. The sendmail trapdoor could be decoyed by per!mitting normal debugging behavior except for
commands writing or executing parts of memory, which would ap!pear to execute but would be prevented from changing memory.
 
Consider some examples of decoy strategies for the Morris worm.  The propagation of the worm could be de!coyed by providing
additional process-suspension time for all utility calls within the same process, creating an illusion to the intruder that a delay has been
introduced (assuming that the intruder monitors response times) while the other non-offending processes will continue to execute
unhindered.
 
detect [ x: fingerd_call::
( y: param_pass )
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& length(y) > max_buffer_size
read + ] && CONST(process_id)
probe (buffer_overflow)
from execute-program
do enable delay (t) to z: utility_call
& process_id(x) = process_id(z)
 
The sendmail trapdoor could be decoyed by directing its invoker to a decoy function protected_read() that simulates the behavior
with correct read commands and by deactivating write com!mands via the decoy function dummy()to substituting write operations:
detect x: sendmail_call::
( [ utility_call + ] 
    && CONST(caller_id)
&& CONST(caller_process_type)
&& FREQUENCY(time_interval)
    ) & in_debug_mode(x) = True
from execute-program
do substitute z: write
& process_id(x) = process_id(z)
by dummy()
substitue w: read
& process_id(x) = process_id(w)
by protected_read()
Finally, the fingerd buffer-overflow to change the oper!ating-system stack could be simulated via the instrumentation of the pop
operations on the stack to simulate a jump to the new designated area of memory and execution of its commands with the current
execution environment, re!quiring a full simulation of what happens there but on a copy of the operating system designated only for the
offending process.  Decoy methods like these can be generalized for broader applicability (by inserting code to call a general decoy
monitor into many executa!bles and parts of the operating system) or specialized for efficiency (by com!piling separate decoy-enabled
versions of executables that can be called when suspicious activi!ties occur) depending on design priorities.
A software decoy should try to fool an intruder into thinking it is real.  A necessary condition is that it returns most of the bits of
information that would be returned by the real component corresponding to the simulated com!ponent.  (This is not a sufficient condition
because the type of information returned may be important even for the same number of bits.)  A necessary information-theo !retic
condition for this is that the size of the decoy in bits must be most of the size of the amount of information it must transmit—and in the
case of complex decoys that are too hard to summarize in an input-response table, per!haps larger still to model the decoying behavior in
an easy-to-debug and easy-to-update way.  However, in many practical situations it is sufficient that the decoy provide only a sample of
all possible behaviors in re!sponse to only a sample of possible attacker inputs.  For instance, a software decoy need only provide
convincing fakes for the protected files that an attacker asks to see.  For such situations, a good measure of decoy quality is the difference
between the number of bits expected by the attacker and the number of bits transmitted.  So if the same response is given to each of three
actions, the num!ber of bits transmitted remains the same as if one response is give to one action, but the number of bits expected is
tripled.
V. SOFTWARE DECOY ARCHITECTURE
We turn now to the implementation of the event-trace language to support software decoys.  The structural (i.e., domain behavior) model
will consist of event types, event attributes, and axioms.  Event types and attributes should be detectable independently.
 
A specialized compiler will selectively instrument soft!ware components for the purpose of detection of events and event attributes.  It
might be neces !sary from a per!formance per!spective to optimize the instrumentation.  In addition, the compiler may need to be
constructed with an option that permits the user to store event traces; for in!stance, the user may want to use these traces for debugging
purposes.
 
The runtime architecture will include mecha!nisms for monitoring behavior-pattern implementation, via the use of state transition
diagrams and buffers to maintain event-attribute values.
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Fig. 1 represents one possi!ble architectural solution for implementing intelligent software decoys, in particular, for software components
within an operating system.  The separation of the repository of rules and behavior patterns from the supervisor supports the maintenance
of the re!pository without changing the implementation (i.e., com!ponent wrappers and supervisor); the repository and behavior model are
confidential within the system under protection.
Execution of system commands contributes the main part of the event types in our behavior model. Each system command participating
in the model is enclosed in a wrapper, which is responsible for sending to the supervi!sor messages about event beginning and end and
event attributes. The wrapper also contains a lightweight framework for implementing decoy actions, e.g. substi!tuting the execution of
the command by another subrou!tine execution, delay implementation, etc.  Behav!ior pattern detection is based on state transition




Fig. 1.  Software decoy architecture.
VI. RELATED WORK
The notions of event, path expression, and assertion lan!guage are well known in testing and debugging automation research.  An event-
based debugger for the C programming language called Dalek [11] provides user defined events that typically are points within a
program execution trace. A target program has to be instrumented manually in order to collect values of event attributes.  The path
expression technique was introduced for speci!fying parallel programs in [12]. This technique has been used in several projects on high-
level debugging tools, (e.g. in [13]), where path rules are suggested as a kind of debug!ger command. Assertions (or annotations)
currently in use are mostly based on Boolean expressions attached to se!lected points of the target program (e.g., the assert macro in C). 
The ANNA [14] annotation language for Ada sup!ports asser!tions on variable and type declarations.  In the TSL [15] annotation language
for Ada, the notion of event is introduced to describe the behavior of tasks. The RAPIDE project [16] provides a rich event-based asser !-
tion lan !guage for software architecture description. In [17], a practical approach to assertions for the C lan!guage is ad !vocated.  Our
language for computations over traces provides a flexible means for writing both local and global assertions, including those about
temporal relations be!tween events.  It supports all kinds of assertions used in the systems above in a uniform framework.
 
Sekar and Uppuluri [6] describe a high-level for!malism for specifying intended program behaviors using patterns over sequences of
system calls.  The patterns also capture conditions on the values of system-call ar!guments.  Their intrusion prevention and detection
system is based on intercepting system calls, comparing them against the specifications, and disallowing calls that devi!ate from the
specifications of valid behaviors.  In their approach, it is possible to modify a system call before it is delivered to the operating system’s
kernel, permitting the system to react before the execution by a process of any damage-causing system call. The paper also presents a
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low-overhead algorithm for matching runtime behaviors against specifications. Based on a series of experiments, Sekar and Uppuluri
report that the overhead for imple!menting their monitoring algorithm on average is approximately four percent of the runtime.
 
We suggest a more powerful and expressive pattern speci!fication language based on precise behavior models (event grammars) that will
be able to capture a broader class of behaviors than those described by Sekar and Uppuluri.   We also expect that our im!plementation
strat!egy will be close to the guidelines presented by Sekar and Uppuluri, thus keeping the runtime overhead at or below four percent.
Neumann and Porras describe the architecture for EMERALD—an environment for anomaly and misuse detection—and sub!sequent
analysis of the behavior of the systems and networks [18].  The architecture of EMERALD is based on com!ponent principles and can be
adjusted to various plat!forms and configurations. A pro!duction-based expert system is used to analyze behavior patterns and signa!tures.
The use of event traces for reasoning about the behavior of information systems is not new.  Event traces have been used to reason about
the correctness of the execution of hardware-level instructions.  For instance, Bressoud and Schneider [19] present an approach to fault
tolerance based on the use of hypervisors that emulate the target hardware architecture:  Each hypervi!sor serves as a virtual machine. 
The hypervisor is then instrumented to watch for sequences of instructions, within an epoch (i.e., inter!val of time), that are critical to the
cor!rect operation of replicated hardware within a system.
 
Working at a higher level of abstraction, Erlingsson and Schneider [20] introduce an approach known as Security Automata SFI
Implementation (SASI).  In this approach, the object code is instrumented so that as sequences of events occur, the trusted computing
base, which in this case includes the software that performs object code analysis and object code modification, can use the event traces to
reason about whether the traces are conformant to security policy (e.g., memory-protection policy).
 
Bressoud and Schneider [19] discuss some of the difficul!ties in instrumentation of virtual machines and reasoning over sequences of
hardware instructions.  Likewise, Erlingsson and Schneider admit that it is diffi!cult to rec!ognize pat!terns of interest from specifications
of object and security policy represented in their security automa!ton lan!guage (SAL), and that the development of such specifications is
an “awk!ward and error-prone” process.  Their new ap!proach is to rely on the use of “an!notations of the object code that are easily
checked and that expose application-level abstrac!tions,” rather than checking every machine-level instruction.  Our formalism of decoys
relies on specifying events for which the source code of compo!nents can be instrumented.
 
Sekar and Uppuluri [6] attempt to defend against buffer-overflow attacks by injecting code and addresses into memory, and transferring
control flow to the injected code.  They manually instrument system calls and their arguments for each component to be protected against
buffer-overflow at!tacks.  A run-time monitor then com!pares these patterns of nominal and anomalous be!havior with that of the runtime
behavior of the protected compo!nent.  Our approach differs from that of Sekar and Uppuluri, especially in terms of the method of instru !-
mentation:  that is, in our approach, the software components are automatically instrumented.
 
Liu and Jajodia [21] introduce specialized decoying meth!ods and strategies for transaction-level intrusion tolerance and damage
confinement in database management sys !tems (DBMS).  The approach is bound to transaction events within the DBMS and relies on the
use of filtering strategies.  In contrast, our approach can be specialized to different types of events and countermeasures.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our approach explicitly treats the two types of invoca!tions of components:  standard and nonstandard, with the latter representing an
attempt by a process to circumvent the public interface of the component.  For standard types of invocations or components of legacy
systems for which the source code is not available, then certain types of events of interest will not be detectable.
The behavior model based on event grammars provides a uniform framework for behavior-pattern recognition and decoying actions.  In
our opinion, this is a practical road to formalizing knowledge about typical intrusion patterns and constructing a flexible system of
countermeasures.
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